The Role of Judge and Jury: Conforming the Evidence Code to the Federal Rules by Mendez, Miguel A
California Evidence Code-Federal Rules
of Evidence
III. The Role of Judge and Jury:
Conforming the Evidence Code to the
Federal Rules
By MIGUEL A. M9NDEZ*
Table of Contents
I. Allocating Power Between Judge and Jury .............. 1004
II. Preliminary Matters Governed by Section 403 ........... 1010
III. Preliminary Matters Governed by Section 405 ........... 1014
IV. The Burden of Proof in Section 405 Determinations .... 1019
V. The Rules of Evidence and Determinations Under
Sections 403 and 405 ................................... 1021
VI. Conditional Admissibility ............................... 1022
VII. Preliminary Fact Determinations Involving Ultimate
Issu es ................................................... 1024
VIII. Limiting Instructions and Section 403 Determinations .. 1026
IX. Other Provisions Relating to Admissibility .............. 1027
X. Summary of Major Differences Between the Code and
the R ules ............................................... 1028
* Adelbert H. Sweet Professor of Law, Stanford University. This paper was prepared
in response to a request by the California Law Revision Commission for an assessment of
whether the California Evidence Code should be replaced by the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The Commission was created by the California Legislature in 1953 as the
permanent successor to the Code Commission and given responsibility for the continuing
review of California statutory and decisional law. The Commission studies the law in order
to discover defects and anachronisms, and recommends legislation to make needed
reforms. Part III, The Role of Judge and Jury, is the third paper in the series and was
submitted to the Commission on August 1, 2003. The California and federal provisions
compared were in effect as of December 2002.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
I. Allocating Power Between Judge and Jury
THE CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE Code ("Code") and the Federal
Rules of Evidence ("Rules") have much in common in defining the
respective roles of judges and jurors. Their differences, while signifi-
cant in some instances, are few in number.
The California provisions are gathered in Article 2 of Chapter 4
of the Evidence Code, which contains the rules on the admission and
exclusion of evidence.' Article 2, entitled "Preliminary Determina-
tions on Admissibility of Evidence,"2 begins by defining as preliminary
facts those facts upon whose existence or nonexistence depends the
admissibility or inadmissibility of other evidence offered by the parties
to prove their contentions."
Questions regarding the admissibility of evidence are classified by
the Code as questions of law to be decided by the judge. 4 The Federal
Rules of Evidence are in accord,5 and both the Code and Rules specify
the procedure the judge is to follow in determining the existence or
nonexistence of disputed preliminary facts.6
The Code expressly commits all "questions of fact" to the jurors,
including questions regarding the credibility of witnesses and hearsay
declarants. 7 The Rules do not have an analogous provision. A specific
rule, however, may be unnecessary since, under the common law,
judges determined the admissibility of the evidence and jurors
weighed the evidence that was admitted.8
Sections 403 and 405 are the principal Code provisions governing
the proof of preliminary facts. In pertinent part they provide as
follows:
Section 403. Determination of foundational and other preliminary
facts where relevancy, personal knowledge, or authenticity is
disputed
(a) The proponent of the proffered evidence has the burden of
producing evidence as to the existence of the preliminary fact, and
the proffered evidence is inadmissible unless the court finds that
there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the existence of
the preliminary fact, when:
1. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 350-406 (West 1995).
2. See id. §§ 400-406.
3. Id. § 400 law revision commission's cmt.
4. CAL. EVID. CODE § 310 (West 1995).
5. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
6. FED. R. EVID. 104(c); CAL. EVID. CODE § 402 (West 1995).
7. CAL. EVID. CODE § 312.
8. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 53 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
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(1) The relevance of the proffered evidence depends on the
existence of the preliminary fact;
(2) The preliminary fact is the personal knowledge of a witness
concerning the subject matter of his testimony;
(3) The preliminary fact is the authenticity of a writing; or
(4) The proffered evidence is of a statement or other conduct
of a particular person and the preliminary fact is whether that
person made the statement or so conducted himself.
(b) Subject to Section 702, the court may admit conditionally the
proffered evidence under this section, subject to evidence of the
preliminary fact being supplied later in the course of the trial.
(c) If the court admits the proffered evidence under this section,
the court:
(1) May, and on request shall, instruct the jury to determine
whether the preliminary fact exists and to disregard the prof-
fered evidence unless the jury finds that the preliminary fact
does exist.
(2) Shall instruct the jury to disregard the proffered evidence
if the court subsequently determines that ajury could not rea-
sonably find that the preliminary fact exists.
Section 405. Determination of foundational and other preliminary
facts in other cases
With respect to preliminary fact determinations not governed by
Section 403 or 404:
(a) When the existence of a preliminary fact is disputed, the court
shall indicate which party has the burden of producing evidence
and the burden of proof on the issue as implied by the rule of law
under which the question arises. The court shall determine the ex-
istence or nonexistence of the preliminary fact and shall admit or
exclude the proffered evidence as required by the rule of law
under which the question arises.
(b) If a preliminary fact is also a fact in issue in the action:
(1) The jury shall not be informed of the court's determina-
tion as to the existence or nonexistence of the preliminary
fact.
(2) If the proffered evidence is admitted, the jury shall not be
instructed to disregard the evidence if its determination of the
fact differs from the court's determination of the preliminary
fact.9
The corresponding federal rule, Rule 104, in pertinent part pro-
vides as follows:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions con-
cerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence
of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined
by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making
its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges.
9. CAL. EWiD. CODE §§ 403, 405 (West 1995). Section 404 governs the admissibility of
Fifth Amendment privilege claims.
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(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall
admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient
to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition."0
Useful as that rule of thumb may be-thatjudges determine the
admissibility of the evidence'' while jurors find the "facts" from that
evidence'2-it does not answer all questions that might arise in the
course of a trial. One reason is thatjudges often have to make factual
determinations in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Another
reason is thatjudges play two distinct roles in making their admissibil-
ity rulings. One role calls for the judge to screen the proffered evi-
dence on a sufficiency basis; the other by a higher standard, usually by
a preponderance of the evidence.' 3 An example helps illustrate the
differences in the two roles:
Assume that the accused is prosecuted for murder. The prosecu-
tion calls Witness A to testify that the accused told her that he killed
the victim. The accused objects to the testimony on the ground that
he made no such statement and offers to testify to that effect. The
prosecution responds that the jury is entitled to hear Witness A's testi-
mony irrespective of the accused's testimony and that, as a result, the
accused must wait until his case-in-chief to offer his testimony. On
what basis should the judge rule on the objection?
When the opponent claims that a declarant did not make a state-
ment attributed to him, the objection is one of irrelevancy. In our
example, if the accused was not the one who confessed to killing the
victim, the declaration would be immaterial and therefore not proba-
tive of a proposition that is properly provable in the action. 14 That
objection is determined by thejudge under the sufficiency standard in
section 403. It provides that when the proffered evidence is the state-
10. FED. R. EVID. 104. With minor exceptions, the approach of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence to preliminary fact determinations is taken from FED. R. EVID. 104. See also UNIF.
R. EVID. 104.
11. Questions of law, including questions regarding the admissibility of evidence, are
for the court. CAL. Evin. CODE § 310. Other questions of law include the construction of
statutes, Forio v. Lau, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 409, 410 (Ct. App. 1998); of written contracts, Hep-
pler v. J, M. Peters Co., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497, 507 (Ct. App. 1999); whether a plaintiff in a
defamation action is a public figure, Khawar v. Globe Intern., Inc., 965 P.2d 696, 702, cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1114 (1998); and whether a duty exists in a tort actionJohnson v. United
Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 234, 240 (Ct. App. 1998), disapproved on other
grounds, Leuter v. California, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 68, 71 (Ct. App. 2002).
12. CAL. EVID. CODE § 312.
13. CAL. EviD. CODE § 115 assembly committee on judiciary cmt.
14. For an extended discussion of relevance, see Miguel A. Mdndez, EVIDENCE: THE
CALIFORNIA CODE AND THE FEDERAL RULES-PROBLEM APPROACH § 2.01 (2d ed. 1999).
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ment of a particular person and the preliminary fact is whether that
person made the statement, the judge should exclude the proffered
evidence unless the proponent produces "evidence sufficient to sus-
tain a finding of the existence of the preliminary fact .... -15
The sufficiency standard of section 403 places strict limits on the
role of the judge. The judge must let the jurors hear the declaration if
the judge concludes that reasonable jurors could find that the accused
made the statement. In making this assessment, the judge cannot pass
on the credibility of the witnesses; that responsibility is assigned to the
jury. The sole question for the judge is whether a reasonable jury
could find the preliminary fact if the proponent's evidence is be-
lieved. Since Witness A is prepared to testify that he heard the accused
confess to killing the victim, that evidence alone satisfies the suffi-
ciency standard of section 403. Accordingly, the judge must overrule
the accused's objection and deny his request to take the stand to tes-
tify that he did not make the statement. The accused must wait until
his case-in-chief. If at that time the accused denies having told Witness
A that he killed the victim and the judge finds the accused to be more
credible than Witness A, the judge nonetheless must let Witness A's
account stand. It is up to the jurors, not the judge, to determine
whether to believe Witness A or the accused. Empowering the judge
to withhold this kind of evidence from the jury based solely on the
judge's assessment of who is telling the truth would deprive the prose-
cution of the right to have the jury determine an important factual
question. 16
. Section 403 provides the losing party some consolation. Upon re-
quest, the judge must instruct the jurors to disregard the proffered
evidence unless they first find the preliminary fact.' 7 In our example,
they would be told to disregard the confession unless they first find
that indeed the accused made the statement. But the Code and the
Rules, as we shall see, are silent on the standard by which the jurors
must find that the victim made the statement.
A federal judge would make the same rulings under Rule 104(b).
The relevance of Witness A's testimony depends on whether the ac-
cused made the admission Witness A attributes to him. In the lan-
guage of Rule 104(b), "the relevancy of [the] evidence depends upon
15. CAL. EVID. CODE § 403(a).
16. Id. § 403 assembly committee on judiciary cmt. ("If the judge finally determined
the existence or nonexistence of the preliminary fact, he would deprive a party of a jury
decision on a question that the party has a right to have decided by the jury.").
17. Id. § 403(c)(1).
Summer 2003]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
the fulfillment of a condition of fact," namely whether the accused
made the admission. 18 In determining whether to let the jurors hear
Witness A's testimony, the federal judge is directed by the Rule to
apply a sufficiency standard.' 9 The principal difference between the
Code and the Rules in this respect is that the Code explicitly informs
the judge and the litigants that the question whether the accused
made the admission is to be governed by the standards set out in sec-
tion 403. As will be shown, the Code expressly identifies the prelimi-
nary fact questions that are impliedly embraced by Rule 104(b).
Providing the judge, the parties, and their lawyers with this kind of
information is useful to trial planning and management. Section 403
is therefore superior to Rule 104(b) and should be retained.
Upon request, a federal judge would also give the jurors a limit-
ing instruction telling them to disregard Witness A's testimony unless
they first find that the accused made the admission. However, giving
such an instruction upon request would be the product of established
practice and not the result of a directive under the Federal Rules. The
Rules do not contain a provision equivalent to section 403(c) (1)
which requires the judge, upon request, to instruct the jurors to disre-
gard the proffered evidence unless they find that the preliminary fact
in issue exists. 20 This subdivision provides useful guidance to judges,
litigants and their lawyers, and should be retained.
Assume that the prosecution calls a second witness, Officer B, to
testify that the accused confessed to killing the victim. The accused
objects to the introduction of the confession on the ground that the
confession was coerced and requests permission to produce evidence
to that effect. Must the judge grant the accused's request? The answer
under both Federal and California law is yes. Constitutional considera-
tions aside, the questions raised by the accused's objection are gov-
erned in California by Evidence Code section 405. This section "deals
with evidentiary rules designed to withhold evidence from the jury be-
cause it is too unreliable to be evaluated properly .. .. ",21 Section 405
proceeds on the assumption that it is unrealistic to expect a jury to
disregard a confession which it finds to be involuntary, especially
when parts of the confession are corroborated by other evidence. 22
18. FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
19. Id.
20. CAL. EVID. CODE § 403(c)(1).
21. Id.
22. CAL. EVID. CODE § 405 assembly committee onjudiciary cmt. (West 1995). See also
John Kaplan, Of Mabrus and Zorgs-An Essay in Honor of David Louisell, 66 CAL. L. REV. 987,
1008-1009 (1978) (arguing that only ajudge's determination of whether a confession was
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Accordingly, section 405 entitles the opponent to a hearing on the
existence or nonexistence of the preliminary facts, which in this case
center on the voluntariness of the confession.
Assume that at the hearing the accused testifies that Officer B
promised him leniency in return for the confession and that Officer B
denies having made any such promises. By what standard must the
judge resolve the conflict in the evidence? Unless the rule of law appli-
cable to the preliminary fact dispute states otherwise, the proponent
must convince the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the
proffered evidence meets the required standards of trustworthi-
ness23-in our case that the accused confessed voluntarily. Under sec-
tion 405, the judge sits as a jury of one. Like the jurors, the judge is
entitled to consider both sides of the evidence, including the credibil-
ity of the witnesses. If at the conclusion of the section 405 hearing the
judge believes Officer B, he will let the jury hear the confession. If he
believes the accused, he will withhold the confession from the jury. If
the judge cannot decide whom to believe, he will also withhold the
confession, since the prosecution has the burden of persuasion.
Section 405 hearings differ from section 403 hearings in three
important respects. First, unless the proponent stipulates to the oppo-
nent's evidence, the judge must allow the opponent to offer evidence
of the nonexistence of the preliminary fact before ruling on the objec-
tion. Second, in ruling on whether the proponent has carried the bur-
den of persuasion, the judge can consider the evidence produced by
each side, as well as the credibility of the witnesses. Third, if the judge
overrules the objection and admits the proffered evidence, the oppo-
nent is not entitled to an instruction telling the jurors to disregard the
evidence unless they first find the preliminary fact 24 -in the above
example that the confession was voluntary. The opponent is not given
a "second bite" at the apple, i.e., to have the jurors, as well as the
judge, consider the admissibility of the evidence. That power is dele-
gated exclusively to the judge by section 405. The jury, however, still
retains the power to accept or reject the confession, since the jury
ultimately decides what weight, if any, to give to witnesses' testimony.25
taken in compliance with Miranda or was voluntary promotes the policies excluding illegal
confessions).
23. CAL. EvD. CODE § 405 assembly committee on judiciary cmt. Unless the rule of
law governing the preliminary fact determination under § 405 specifies a higher burden of
persuasion, the applicable standard is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. § 115.
24. Id. § 405(b) (2).
25. Id. §§ 312, 405 assembly committee on judiciary cmt., § 406.
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In deciding the weight to give to the confession, the jurors may con-
sider both the officer's and the accused's testimony.
A federal judge should behave exactly as a California judge in
determining the admissibility of the confession. However, this would
not be readily apparent to California practitioners reading Federal
Rule 104(a) and its accompanying Advisory Committee Note. As will
be explained, the Code has default provisions allocating and defining
the production and persuasion burdens when those burdens are unas-
certainable under the "rule of law" governing the specific question
arising under section 405. The Federal Rules do not. The United
States Supreme Court has filled this gap by holding that the propo-
nent of the evidence should be required to prove preliminary fact
questions arising under Rule 104(a) by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.26 As will be explained, this holding is inconsistent with the role
of the California judge when ruling on some aspects of hearsay decla-
rations which in California are governed by section 403. In general,
sections 403 and 405 represent a better thought out approach to pre-
liminary fact questions and should be retained.
II. Preliminary Matters Governed by Section 403
Scholars disagree on when judges should use a sufficiency stan-
dard, as contemplated in section 403, or a higher standard, as is the
case under section 405, in ruling on the admissibility of evidence.2 7
The Code avoids the controversy by describing with particularity the
kinds of preliminary fact issues governed by section 403 and relegat-
ing all other issues for determination under section 405.28 Moreover,
to eliminate uncertainties, various Code sections specifically state that
admissibility depends on satisfying a sufficiency standard. 29 Finally,
the comment to section 403 provides a useful commentary on the
kinds of preliminary fact determinations that fall under the section.
Rule 104(b), on the other hand, does not specify the preliminary
fact questions that fall within its ambit. Although the term "condi-
tional relevancy" used in the advisory committee note probably em-
26. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). See also Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S. 681, 684 (1988).
27. CAL. EvID. CODE § 403 assembly committee on judiciary cmt. See generally Kaplan,
supsra note 22 (examining the proper roles of judge and jury in making preliminary fact
determinations).
28. See CAL. Evin. CODE §§ 403, 405. A separate section, section 404, governs the ques-
tion of whether the judge should sustain a claim of privilege tinder the self-incrimination
clause. Id. § 404.
29. See, e.g., id. §§ 1222, 1223, 1400.
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braces the kinds of preliminary fact questions listed under section
403,30 Rule 104(b) does not provide judges, litigants, or lawyers with
the same kind of detailed guidance as does section 403 and its
comment.
The preliminary fact issues listed in section 403 "are not finally
decided by the judge because they have been traditionally regarded as
jury questions. The questions involve the credibility of testimony or
the probative value of evidence that is admitted on the ultimate is-
sues." 31 To preserve the jury's right to determine factual issues,3 2 sec-
tion 403 limits judges to applying a sufficiency standard in screening
the admissibility of evidence subject to the section. Federal Rule
104(b) likewise achieves the same goal by requiring the judge to use a
sufficiency test in screening the admissibility of evidence falling within
the rule's ambit.33
The preliminary facts subject to resolution under section 403 are
as follows:
Relevance of the proffered evidence. Section 403 governs when
the relevance of the proffered evidence depends on the existence of a
preliminary fact.3 4 As the Assembly Committee notes, "[I]f P sues D
upon an alleged agreement, evidence of negotiations with A is inad-
missible because irrelevant unless A is shown to be D's agent; but the
evidence of the negotiations with A is admissible if there is evidence
sufficient to sustain a finding of the agency."35
Personal knowledge of a witness. Section 702 provides that the
testimony of a lay witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissi-
ble unless the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. 36 Against
objection, personal knowledge must be shown before the witness may
testify about the matter.37 Section 403 governs when the witnesses'
personal knowledge is contested. 3
Section 800 permits lay witnesses to testify in the form of an opin-
ion if it is rationally based on the perception of the witness and the
30. See infra text accompanying note 52. Professor John Kaplan questions whether
Rule 104(b) embraces all of the situations enumerated by Code § 403. See Kaplan, supra
note 22, at 995.
31. CAL. EvID. CODE § 403 assembly committee on judiciary cmt.
32. See id. § 312(a).
33. FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
34. CAL. EVID. CODE § 404(a)(1).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 702.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 403.
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opinion is helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testi-
mony.3 9 Whether or not the opinion is based on the witness's percep-
tion is governed by section 403, as the limitation "is merely a specific
application of the personal knowledge requirement." 40
Authenticity of writings. When a writing is offered in evidence,
the proponent must also offer evidence that the writing is what the
proponent claims it to be.4' If in a contract dispute the plaintiff offers
a writing which she claims is the contract she and the defendant en-
tered into, then the plaintiff must offer some evidence indicating that
the writing is indeed that contract. Whether or not the writing is the
contract is governed by section 403.42 To eliminate any uncertainty
about that point, section 1400, which defines authentication, imposes
the same requirement. 43
Although authentication is usually associated with writings, the
concept applies whenever any tangible object is offered in evidence. 44
Whether the object is the knife the prosecution believes the accused
used to kill the victim or the ladder the plaintiff claims was defective,
the proponent must connect the object with the case. Showing that
the object is relevant to the issues to be decided will require some
evidence that the object is'what the proponent claims it to be. For
purposes of admissibility, the quantum of evidence, as in the case of
writings, need satisfy only section 403's sufficiency standard.
Identity of the actor or declarant. Section 403 governs when
"[t] he proffered evidence is of a statement or other conduct of a par-
ticular person and the preliminary fact is whether that person made
the statement or so conducted himself. '45 Impeaching a witness
through a prior conviction assumes that the witness was the person
who was convicted. If the identity of the person convicted is disputed,
the judge must permit the use of the conviction if the proponent dem-
onstrates by a sufficiency of the evidence that the person convicted
was the witness.46 The same principle applies when the preliminary
issue is whether a particular person engaged in other conduct, includ-
ing the making of statements. 47
39. Id. § 800.
40. Id. § 403 assembly committee on judiciary cmt.
41. Id. § 1400.
42. Id. § 403(a) (3).
43. Id. § 1400.
44. Id. § 1400 law revision commission's crnt.
45. Id. § 403(a) (4).
46. Id. § 403 assembly committee on judiciary cmt.
47. id.
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Earlier we saw that when the identity of a declarant is contested,
the declaration may be received if the proponent establishes the iden-
tity of the declarant by a sufficiency of the evidence. 4 The same stan-
dard applies to the identity of hearsay declarants. Thus, any evidence
that the statement was made by the claimed declarant is sufficient to
warrant the introduction of admissions by parties under section 1220,
of previous statements by witnesses under sections 1235-1236, as well
as of the statements by the declarants who are.described in sections
1224-1227 and whose liability, breach of duty, or right is at issue. 49
Whether a party has authorized or adopted an admission is also
governed by section 403.50 Since in California the admission of a co-
conspirator is a form of an authorized admission, the admission is ad-
missible upon the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a find-
ing of the conspiracy.51
Section 403 and the doctrine of conditional relevance. A review of
the kinds of preliminary facts governed by section 403 reveals that
most involve some aspect of relevance. A writing or other tangible ob-
ject is irrelevant unless it is what the proponent claims it to be; the
statement of a declarant is irrelevant unless the declarant made the
statement; similarly, a person's conduct is irrelevant unless it is the
conduct of that person. In each instance the evidence is irrelevant
unless some condition is fulfilled. For this reason, some scholars view
these preliminary fact determinations as calling for a special relevance
analysis known as "conditional relevancy."52 This is the approach
taken by the Federal Rules of Evidence to these kinds of preliminary
fact determinations. The Rules, like the Code, condition the admis-
sion of the proffered evidence upon proof of the preliminary facts by
a sufficiency standard. 53
The personal knowledge requirement does not rest upon con-
cepts of relevance, special or otherwise. Requiring lay witnesses to tes-
tify on the basis of first-hand knowledge has more to do with using the
48. See supra text accompanying note 15.
49. Id. But see Kaplan supra note 22 (arguing that, where disputed, the identity of the
hearsay declarant should be governed by section 405 since jurors are unlikely to determine
whether a party made the statement before considering the statement). For a description
of the declarants in §§ 1224-1227, see M.NDEZ, supra note 14, § 7.03.
50. CAL. EviD. CODE § 403 assembly committee on judiciary cmt.
51. Id. For a discussion of the foundational requirements for admitting co-conspira-
tors' declarations, see MNDEZ, supra note 14, § 7.04. Federal requirements differ from
those imposed by the Code. See id.
52. See the authorities listed in FED. R. EVID. 104 advisory committee's note.
53. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
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most reliable sources of information than with relevance. 5 4 But even
in ithis instance the use of a sufficiency standard is justified: jurors are
as capable as judges in ascertaining whether a witness acquired his or
her knowledge through the use of the senses.55 Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 602 takes a similar approach. 56
III. Preliminary Matters Governed by Section 405
Section 405 is designed to be a default provision. If a preliminary
issue is not governed by section 403, it will be determined under sec-
tion 405. 5 7 Despite the simplicity of this approach, uncertainty about
the scope of section 403 led the drafters of the Code to list in their
comment some of the preliminary fact issues governed by section 405.
These include the following:
Competency of witnesses. Whether a witness is capable of expres-
sing himself in a manner that can be understood or is capable of un-
derstanding the duty to tell the truth are matters to be resolved by the
judge under section 405.58 But, as has been noted,59 whether a witness
possesses the requisite personal knowledge is decided by the judge
under section 403. Under Rule 104(a), the questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness are to be determined by the
judge.'0
Qualification of experts. Whether a witness is qualified to pro-
vide the fact finder with an expert opinion is determined by the judge
54. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 8, § 10.
55. The Federal Rules, like the Code, impose a sufficiency standard on the question
of whether a witness is testifying on the basis of firsthand knowledge. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
56. FED. R. EVID. 602.
57. CAL. Evit. CODE § 405 (West 1995). A separate section, section 404, governs
claims of privilege under the self-incrimination clause. See id. § 404. According to Profes-
sor John Kaplan,
A preliminary fact question that determines the admissibility of evidence is a
Mabru [and should be decided under § 405] if and only if the judge must decide
that question to uphold the policy of the rule that makes admissibility of the
evidence turn on the preliminary question of fact to begin with. In other words, a
preliminary fact question is a Mabru, and the judge must determine it, whenever
we cannot trust the jury to apply the rule governing admissibility. All other such
questions, where we can trust the jury, are Zorgs [and should be decided under
§ 403].
Kaplan, supra note 22, at 993. Examples of "mabrus" would include the rules excluding
coerced confessions and confessions taken in violation of Miranda. Id. at 1007-1009. Au-
thentication would be a "zorg."
58. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 701 law revision commission's cmt.
59. See supra text accompanying note 54.
60. FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
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under section 405. 6 1 Accordingly, the judge's determination that the
witness is qualified is binding on the fact finder, but the fact finder
may consider the witness's qualifications in deciding what weight, if
any, to give to the opinion. 62 Moreover, whether the expert's opinion
is based on matters of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
field or on scientific principles and techniques generally accepted by
the pertinent scientific community are questions to be decided by the
judge under section 405. The proponent must convince the judge by a
preponderance of the evidence that expert evidence meets these
tests.
6 3
Under Rule 104(a), whether a person qualifies as an expert is to
be determined by the judge.64
Section 405 also governs whether a witness is sufficiently ac-
quainted with a person to give an opinion on that person's sanity6 5 or
with a person's handwriting to give an opinion on whether a writing is
in that person's handwriting. 66 Since these questions relate to the
qualifications of the witness, presumably they too would be deter-
mined by the judge in federal court under Rule 104(a).
Writings. Although authenticity is a section 403 issue, whether a
writing is genuine must be determined by the judge under section 405
before admitting the writing for comparison with other writings whose
authenticity is in dispute. 67 One would expect a similar role for a fed-
eraljudge if the writing offered for comparison does not raise a condi-
tional relevancy question. Rule 104(a), like section 405, is a default
provision. It is generally applicable unless the preliminary question at
issue is to be decided under the conditional relevancy provision of
Rule 104(b). 68
Under the California Secondary Evidence Rule, 69 a party may
prove the contents of a writing by offering the original writing or sec-
ondary evidence of the original. 7 (l The proponent, however, must of-
fer the original if a genuine dispute exists concerning the material
61. CAL. EVjo. CODE § 405 assembly committee on judiciary cmt.
62. Id. § 720 law revision commission's cmt.
63. See People v. Brown, 726 P.2d 516, 527 (Cal. 1985).
64. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) and advisory committee's note.
65. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 405 assembly committee on judiciary cmt.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. FED. R. EvID. 104(a)-(b) and advisory committee's note ("[Rule 104(a)] is of gen-
eral application. It must, however, be read as subject to the special provisions for 'condi-
tional relevancy' in subdivision (b) .... ").
69. CAL. EVID. CODE §§1521-1522.
70. Id.
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terms of the original and justice requires its exclusion, or if admission
of the secondary evidence would be unfair.7' Presumably, upon objec-
tion the proponent must convince the judge under section 405 either
that no genuine dispute exists concerning the material terms of the
original writing or that admission of the secondary evidence would
not be unfair.72
The Federal Rules of Evidence retain the traditional Best Evi-
dence Rule. Proof of the contents of a writing must be made through
the original writing unless nonproduction of the original writing is
excused. 73 As in California, most questions regarding the satisfaction
of the Rules' requirements are for the judge to decide under the stan-
dards of Rule 104(a). 74
Privileges. The party objecting on the grounds of privilege must
establish the privileged nature of the matter under section 405. 75
Moreover, the party claiming an exception to the privilege must estab-
lish the preliminary facts under the same standard. 76 These rules are
consistent with one of the goals of section 405: to withhold evidence
from the fact finder because public policy requires its exclusion.
Unlike the Code, the Federal Rules do not contain provisions de-
fining privileges. Congress rejected the Rules' article on privileges and
substituted a provision that leaves the development of privileges in
federal question cases to the common law as interpreted by the fed-
eral courts.77 State privilege law applies only in those cases where state
law supplies the rule of decision with respect to an element of a claim
or defense. 7
The policy of withholding evidence from the fact finder because
public policy justifies its exclusion also requires the objecting party to
convince the judge under section 405 that admissions should be ex-
71. 1d. § 1522.
72. This was the practice under the Best Evidence Rule. CAL. EVID. CODE § 405 assem-
bly committee on judiciary cmt. For an extended discussion of the requirements of the
Best Evidence and Secondary Evidence Rules, see M~ndez, supra note 14 § 13.06.
73. FED. R. EVID. 1002.
74. FED. R. EvID. 1008 advisory committee's note.
75. CAL. EvID. CODE § 405 assembly committee on judiciary cmt. Most privileges for
confidential communications create a presumption that the communications protected by
these privileges were made in confidence. See MtNDEZ, supra note 14, § 20.04.
76. CAL. EVID. CODE § 405 assembly committee on judiciary cmt.
77. FED. R. EvID. 501 and Federal Judicial Center's note. Professors Mueller and Kirk-
patrick believe that the federal common law places upon the party opposing the privilege
the burden of showing that an exception applies. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 1.12 (2d ed. 1999).
78. See Fed. R. Evid. 501 and advisory committee's note.
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cluded because made in the course of compromise negotiations.7 9
The same result should obtain in federal court under Rule 104(a).
Witness unavailability. The proponent of hearsay evidence of the
type that is admissible only when the declarant is unavailable has the
burden of persuading the judge of the declarant's unavailability as a
witness under section 405.80 If the opponent objects to the evidence
on the ground that the proponent procured the declarant's unavaila-
bility to prevent the declarant from testifying, the opponent must es-
tablish that claim under section 405.81
The Rules and Advisory Committee Notes are silent on these
points. Presumably, these questions are committed to the judge for
resolution under the standards of Rule 104(a). However, neither this
rule nor its accompanying note indicates which party should have the
production and persuasion burdens. The federal approach to hearsay
is that of the common law, that is, a general rule of exclusion with
exceptions.8 2 Under this approach, the burden of proof on prelimi-
nary matters relating to admissibility is usually on the proponent.83
Thus, upon objection the proponent of the evidence would have to
persuade the judge of the declarant's unavailability. Because of the
Rules' silence, resort to the federal common law is necessary to deter-
mine whether the opponent has the burden of proof on the question
of whether the proponent procured the declarant's unavailability.
Hearsay evidence.
When hearsay evidence is offered, two preliminary fact questions
may be raised. The first question relates to the authenticity of the
proffered declaration-was the statement actually made by the per-
son alleged to have made it? The second question relates to the
existence of those circumstances that make the hearsay sufficiently
trustworthy to be received-e.g., was the declaration spontaneous,
the confession voluntary, the business record trustworthy? Under
the Code, questions relating to authenticity of the proffered decla-
ration are decided under Section 403. [O]ther preliminary fact
questions are decided under Section 405.84
Section 405, not section 403, thus governs whether a declaration,
when made, was so far contrary to the declarant's interests that a rea-
sonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true; whether a statement previ-
79. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 405 assembly committee on judiciary cmt.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See Fed. R. Evid., ART. VIII, HEARSAY advisory committee's introductory note.
83. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 77 at § 1.12.
84. CAL. EviD. CODE § 405 assembly committee on judiciary cmt.
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ously made by a witness is inconsistent with the witness's testimony
and complies with the requirements of section 770; whether a state-
ment previously made by a witness is consistent with the witness's testi-
mony and complies with the requirements of section 791; whether a
statement previously made by a witness qualifies as past recollection
recorded; whether a statement previously made by a witness qualifies
as a statement of prior identification; whether a declaration qualifies
as an excited utterance, a contemporaneous statement, a dying decla-
ration, or a declaration against interest; whether a declaration quali-
fies as a statement of a present or past mental state; whether certain
writings meet the requirements for business and official records; and
whether testimony given in another action qualifies as former
testimony.
The use of section 405 to determine the existence of these kinds
of preliminary facts is justified. Section 405 is designed in part to with-
hold evidence from the jury that is too unreliable for proper jury eval-
uation.8 5 Hearsay is the classic example of untrustworthy evidence.
The judge should not expose the jury to it unless the judge is satisfied
that the circumstances justifying its admission as an exception have
been demonstrated under the tough standards of section 405.
The language of Federal Rule of Evidence 104 and its accompa-
nying advisory committee note would support a similar construction
in the case of hearsay and its exceptions. To the extent that the rele-
vance of the hearsay declaration depends on the existence of the pre-
liminary fact in dispute, the question would call for the application of
the sufficiency standard of Rule 104(b). Preliminary fact disputes re-
lating to the circumstances justifying the hearsay exception would fall
within Rule 104(a). This is not, however, the construction given to
Rule 104 by the United States Supreme Court. In California, for exam-
ple, the Code requires the prosecution to prove the foundational facts
of the hearsay exception for co-conspirators's declarations by the suffi-
ciency standard of section 403. The California approach is predicated
on the theory that coconspirators's admissions are a form of author-
ized admissions, and the question of authority is governed by section
403. 16 But in Bouijaily v. United States,8 7 the Court held that under the
Federal Rules the proponent must establish the foundational facts of
85. See id.
86. See id. § 403 assembly committee on judiciary cit.
87. 483 U.S. 171 (1986).
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the coconspirators's hearsay exception by a preponderance of the
evidence.""
Reasonable people might differ on whether the foundational
facts for this hearsay exception should be proved by a sufficiency or
higher standard.89 The point, however, is that the United States Su-
preme Court did not feel constrained by the Rules in selecting the
more likely than not standard. Neither the language of Rule 104(a)
nor its accompanying note specifies the applicable standard as clearly
as do section 403 and its accompanying comment.
IV. The Burden of Proof in Section 405 Determinations
Section 405 does not prescribe the burden of proof that applies
to the determination of the preliminary facts governed by the section.
Instead, section 405 directs the judge to "the rule of law" under which
the issue arises when allocating the burden of producing evidence
and determining the burden of persuasion.90
Confessions provide a good example of how section 405 works. At
one time, the California courts required the prosecution to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the accused had properly waived his Mi-
randa rights or had confessed voluntarily.9' Accordingly, the "rule of
law" under which the issue arose required the prosecution to meet
this standard if the accused challenged a confession on Miranda or
involuntariness grounds.
The standard of proof changed with the advent of Proposition 8's
Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision. This provision gives parties to
criminal proceedings the state constitutional right not to have rele-
vant evidence excluded.92 Since a confession is legally relevant irre-
spective of whether it was taken in compliance with Miranda or given
88. See id. at 175.
89. See generally Kaplan, supra note.22, at 997 (arguing that the foundational facts of
the hearsay exception for co-conspirators' statements should be governed by section 405
since jurors are unlikely to engage in the required fact finding before considering the
statement).
90. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 405.
91. See generally, People v. Stroud, 78 Cal. Rptr. 270, 275 (Ct. App. 1969) (holding that
prosecution must prove compliance with Miranda beyond a reasonable doubt); People v.
Jimenez, 580 P. 2d 672, 678 (Cal. 1978) (holding that prosecution must prove voluntari-
ness beyond a reasonable doubt).
92. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). For an extended discussion of the Right to Truth-
in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8, see M9NDEZ, supra note 14, § 15.03.
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involuntarily, Proposition 8 overturned the cases requiring the prelim-
inary facts to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.93
Proposition 8, of course, cannot diminish federal Constitutional
rights. Today, the admissibility of evidence over a federal Constitu-
tional objection is determined by the standards the United States Su-
preme Court laid down in Lego v. Twomey. 4 In that case, the Court
held that the accused is entitled to a "clear-cut determination" that his
constitutional rights have been observed.95 That demand can be met
only by requiring the prosecution to prove compliance with the Con-
stitutional standards by at least a preponderance of the evidence. 96
Proposition 8 also changed the burden of persuasion that applies
when the accused challenges the legality of a pretrial identification.
Prior to the initiative, the courts required the prosecution to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification was free
from the taint of any illegal pretrial identification .97 Since federal
standards now govern this question, the prosecution need prove only
by a preponderance of the evidence that federal constitutional identi-
fication requirements were observed. 98
The "rule of law" applicable to a given preliminary fact dispute
governed by section 405 may be silent with respect to the burdens of
producing evidence and of persuasion. In such a circumstance, the
Code provides two default positions on these questions. Section 115
provides that, unless otherwise provided by law, the burden of persua-
sion requires "proof by a preponderance of the evidence." 99 Section
550 in turn places the burden of producing evidence on a particular
issue on the party with the burden of persuasion on that issue. 100 As a
rule, then, unless the applicable rule of law states otherwise, the pro-
ponent must come forward with evidence that convinces the judge by
93. See generally People v. Kelly, 800 P.2d 516, 542 n. 1 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., concur-
ring) (holding that compliance with Miranda need be shown merely by a preponderance
of the evidence); see also People v. Markham, 775 P.2d 1042, 1047 (Cal. 1989) (holding that
voluntariness need be shown merely by a preponderance of the evidence).
94. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
95. See id. at 483.
96. See id. at 484; see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986) (waiver of
Miranda rights); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974) (suppression motions
raising Fourth Amendment questions). For a discussion of whether proof beyond a reason-
able doubt should apply in determining the admissibility of confessions, dying declara-
tions, and some declarations against interest, see Stephen A. Saltzburg, Standards of Proof
and Preliminay Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1975).
97. See People v. Martin, 471 P.2d 29, 37 (Cal. 1970).
98. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477.
99. CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1995).
100. See id. § 550(b).
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a preponderance of the evidence of the existence or nonexistence of
the preliminary facts governed by section 405.
The Rules do not contain similar default provisions with respect
to the allocation of the production and persuasion burdens governing
preliminary fact determinations under Rule 104(a) °11 In the case of
hearsay, however, the Rules place upon the objecting party the bur-
den of persuading the judge that the proffered evidence is assertive
and therefore hearsay. 0 2 Despite claims to the contrary, placing the
burden of persuasion on the opponent is achieved by directive of the
of Advisory Committee in its note and not by the language of Rule
801 (a). The Code is silent on this point. Presumably, in California the
proponent would have the burden of persuading the judge that the
evidence is not assertive. 10 3
V. The Rules of Evidence and Determinations Under
Sections 403 and 405
The rules of evidence apply to hearings on the admissibility of
evidence under sections 403 and 405. The California Law Revision
Commission recommended that the rules not apply to determinations
made under section 405.104 That position, however, was rejected by
the California Legislature.10 5
The Commission was concerned that applying the rules could re-
sult in the exclusion of reliable hearsay statements:
For example, if witness W hears X shout, "Help! I'm falling down
the stairs!", the statement is admissible only if the judge finds that
101. Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick maintain that these burdens are generally on
the proponent in federal court:
Apart from tradition and ease in application, there seem to be three reasons for
this allocation. First, usually the offering party is best situated to explain and jus-
tify the evidence it chooses to present and can best aid the court in applying the
rule in question. Second, the standard allocation is simply an outgrowth or partic-
ular application of the broader idea that a party who asks a court to do anything
usually bears the burden of explaining and justifying the request. Third, this allo-
cation is an aspect of the adversary system in which parties gather and present
evidence, and part of the necessary burden is explaining and justifying considera-
tion of the evidence.
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK supra note 77, § 1.12.
102. See FED. R. EvIn. 801 advisory committee's note.
103. See Miguel A. M~ndez, I. Hearsay and Its Exceptions: Conforming the Evidence Code to
the Federal Rules, 37 U.S.F. L. REv. 351, 353 text accompanying n.9 (2003) (submitted to the
California Law Revision Commission in 2002).
104. Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES 19 (1964).
105. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) advisory committee's note; and the wording in CAL. EVID.
CODE § 405 (West 1995).
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X actually was falling down the stairs while the statement was being
made. If the only evidence that he was falling down the stairs is the
statement itself, or the statements of bystanders who no longer can
be identified, the statement must be excluded. Although the state-
ment is admissible as a substantive matter under the hearsay rule, it
must be held inadmissible if the formal rules of evidence are rig-
idly applied during the judge's preliminary inquiry. 1 6
In the Commission's view, the rules of evidence were developed
largely to protect jurors untrained in the law from weak and unrelia-
ble evidence. 10 7 Judges need no such protection. The Legislature,
however, refused to enact the rule recommended by the Commission.
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence adopted the position
espoused by the Commission and others. The Rules provide that in
determining preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evi-
dence, the judge "is not bound by the rules of evidence except those
with respect to privileges."''8 The federal approach allows the judge
to consider a hearsay declaration as proof of the foundational ele-
ments of a hearsay exception. But whether the declaration alone
should suffice as proof of the foundational facts has been controver-
sial. In 1997 Congress amended Rule 801 (d) (2) to provide that
the contents of the statement shall be considered but are not alone
sufficient to establish the declarant's authority under subdivision
(C), the agency or employment relationship and scope thereof
under subdivision (D), or the existence of the conspiracy and par-
ticipation therein of the declarant and the party against whom the
statement is offered under subdivision (E)."' 9
These subdivisions refer to the hearsay exemptions for author-
ized admissions, admissions by agents and servants, and coconspira-
tors' admissions."' A Commission recommendation allowing Cali-
fornia judges to consider inadmissible evidence in making section 405
determinations should take into account the Rules' limitations on the
sufficiency of such evidence as proof of preliminary facts.
VI. Conditional Admissibility
Sometimes the relevance of an item of evidence depends upon
the proof of other facts. For example, in an action for breach of a
written contract, the relevance of a contract tendered by the plaintiff
106. 6 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES 20
(1964).
107. Id.
108. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
109. Id. 801 (d) (2).
110. Id.
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will depend on whether it was the contract entered into by the defen-
dant. If the contract was signed by someone other than the defendant,
then the relevance of the contract will depend on whether the person
signing was authorized to do so by the defendant.1 I1 Absent evidence
that the defendant entered into the contract or that it was signed by
an agent authorized to do so, the contract would be irrelevant. It
would be wholly unconnected with the defendant and, therefore,
immaterial.
In California, section 403 of the Evidence Code places upon the
proponent of such evidence (the plaintiff in our example) the burden
of producing evidence of facts connecting the contract with the defen-
dant.1 12 Against the objection of the opposing party, the proponent of
the proffered evidence must usually produce the evidence of the pre-
liminary facts (the connecting evidence) before the proffered evi-
dence (the contract) can be received in evidence.' 13 However, the
trial judge may admit the proffered evidence on the condition that
the proponent supply the evidence of the preliminary or connecting
facts before the close of the evidence.1 14
If the proffered evidence is received, the judge may, and upon
request of the opposing party, must instruct the jury to disregard the
proffered evidence unless the jury first finds the preliminary facts.' 1 5
The instruction insures that the judge's conclusion about the exis-
tence of the preliminary fact(s) will not deprive the opponent of ajury
determination of the issue.
The Rules also permit the judge to receive evidence on a condi-
tional basis." 6 Like section 403, the Federal Rules impose a suffi-
ciency test. Upon the opponent's motion, the judge must strike the
evidence unless the proponent introduces "evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding of the fulfillment of the condition."'1' 7 The major differ-
ence between the Rules and the Code is that the Rules do not contain
a provision regarding the limiting instruction. Giving such an instruc-
111. See Brown v. Spencer, 126 P. 493 (Cal. 1912).
112. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 403(a).
113. See id.
114. Id. § 403(b). No such discretion exists when the opposing party objects to evi-
dence on the ground that the witness does not possess the requisite personal knowledge.
Against such an objection, the proponent must show that the witness possesses the re-
quired personal knowledge before the witness may continue with his testimony. Id. § 702.
Accord FED. R. EvD. 602.
115. CAL. EVID. CODE § 403(c)(1).
116. FED. R. EvID. 104(b).
117. Id. For a discussion of the special meaning given to the term "conditional rele-
vance" under the Federal Rules, see supra text accompanying note 52.
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tion is the product of federal trial practice. California should retain
the provision of section 403 governing limiting instructions.
VII. Preliminary Fact Determinations Involving Ultimate
Issues
Section 405 allows judges to withhold evidence from the jury
based on two determinations: first, the judges' resolution of eviden-
tiary conflicts regarding preliminary facts, and second, on their assess-
ment of the credibility of the witnesses called to prove or disprove the
preliminary facts." 8 The judges' broad powers to pass on preliminary
fact questions governed by section 405 are justified by the purposes of
the section. Section 405 is "designed to withhold evidence from the
jury because it is too unreliable or because public policy requires its
exclusion."' 19
These broad powers can sometimes threaten a party's right to
jury determinations of factual issues whenever the preliminary fact is-
sue is also an issue involved in the merits of the case. In a contract
action, for example, one of the issues may be the existence of the
contract. The defendant's position might be that the signature on the
contract is not his. Whether or not the signature on the contract is the
defendant's calls for a section 403 determination.1211 The judge's role
in deciding the question will not threaten the parties' right to a jury
decision on the issue because section 403 requires the judge to apply a
sufficiency standard in ruling on the admissibility of the contract.121
Suppose, however, that the plaintiff offers into evidence, not the
original contract, but a copy authenticated as a true copy of the origi-
nal on the theory that the original was lost through no fault of the
plaintiff. Under the Secondary Evidence Rule, the plaintiff may offer a
copy, unless the defendant disputes the existence of the original.122
Whether the original was lost, as claimed by the plaintiff, or never
existed, as claimed by the defendant, is governed by section 405. A
ruling in favor of the plaintiff could imply a finding of the existence of
the contract. To avoid contaminating the jurors with his ruling, the
Code prohibits the judge from informing them about the basis of his
or her ruling. 123
118. See supra text accompanying note 99.
119. CAL. EVID. CODE § 405 assembly committee on judiciary cmt.
120. See supra text accompanying note 40.
121. Id.
122. See Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1520-1521.
123. See id. § 405(b)(I).
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A ruling in favor of the defendant, however, would result in a
verdict in the defendant's favor without the existence or nonexistence
of the contract ever getting to the jury. Accordingly, the Federal Rules
provide that
when an issue is raised (a) whether the asserted writing ever ex-
isted, or (b) whether another writing, recording, or photograph
produced at the trial is the original, or (c) whether other evidence
of contents correctly reflects the contents, the issue is for the trier
of fact to determine as in the case of other issues of fact. 124
The California Secondary Evidence Rule empowers judges to ex-
clude secondary evidence of the content of a writing if the judge con-
cludes that a genuine dispute exists concerning the material terms of
the writing and justice requires its exclusion. 1 25 Since exclusion of
secondary evidence could result in a directed verdict in favor of the
objecting party whenever a disputed material term is dispositive, con-
sideration should be given to adopting the federal approach. 126
California judges have discretion to hold hearings on the admissi-
bility of evidence out of the presence or hearing of the jury.1 2 7 But
challenges to the admissibility of confessions and admissions in crimi-
nal cases must be held out of the jury's presence if requested by any
party. 128 The purpose is to avoid prejudicing the accused in the event
the confession or admission is excluded. The Federal Rules go farther.
The presence of the jurors does not depend on a request by a party.
Hearings on the admissibility of confessions in all cases must be con-
ducted out of the hearing of the jury. 129
Holding hearings out of the presence of the jury can result in the
duplication of evidence. For instance, consider a confession which the
accused claims was coerced. If the judge rules against the accused at
the section 402 hearing1 30 and admits the confession, the accused is
still entitled to urge the jury to give little or no weight to the confes-
124. FED. R. EVID. 1008.
125. CAL. EW4D. CODE § 1521.
126. See Kaplan, supra note 22, at 996 (pointing out that, under California's old best
evidence rule, the Code failed to confer upon California jurors the powers given by Rule
1008 to federal jurors).
127. See Fed. R. Evid. 104(c); see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 402(b).
128. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 402(b). No request is necessary under the Federal Rules. See
FED. R. EVID. 104(c).
129. FED. R. EvID. 104(c).
130. Hearings on the admissibility of evidence under sections 403 and 405 are some-
times denominated "402 hearings" because it is section 402 which authorizes the use of
hearings on admissibility to take place out of the presence of the jury. See CAL. EvWo. CODE
§ 402.
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sion because it was coerced.' 3' To make that argument in summation,
the accused must be given an opportunity to produce the evidence of
coercion before the jury.132 The parties will have to reproduce before
the jury much of the evidence they produced before the judge.
VIII. Limiting Instructions and Section 403 Determinations
If the judge admits the proffered evidence under section 403, the
judge "may, and on request shall, instruct thejury ... to disregard the
proffered evidence unless the jury" first finds the existence of the pre-
liminary fact. ' 33 Section 403, however, is silent on two important ques-
tions: (1) must all the jurors agree on the existence or nonexistence
of the preliminary fact? and, (2) by what standard must the jurors find
the existence or nonexistence of the preliminary fact?
Since jury unanimity is not required in California civil cases,'1. 4
presumably jury unanimity is not required in finding preliminary facts
in civil matters. The same number needed to return a verdict should
suffice in the finding of preliminary facts. And since jurors can return
verdicts based on the preponderance of the evidence in most civil pro-
ceedings,13 5 presumably that standard applies in those proceedings at
least with respect to preliminary facts that are also elements of the
claim or defense.
In California, jury unanimity is required in criminal cases. 136 It
follows, then, that jury unanimity should also be required in finding
preliminary facts that constitute elements of the offense charged. In
California, as elsewhere, jurors can return a guilty verdict only if they
find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 137 Presumably,
that standard applies to preliminary facts that are also elements of the
offense. But the standard may apply to other preliminary facts as well.
At least where circumstantial evidence has been received, jurors are
told that,
each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances nec-
essary to establish . . . guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In other words, before an inference essential to establish
guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable
131. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 406.
132. See id.
133. Id. § 403(c)(1).
134. See CAL. CONsr. art. I § 16.
135. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 115.
136. See CAL. CONs-r. art I, § 16.
137. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (West 1985).
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doubt, each fact or circumstance on which such inference necessa-
rily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' 8
The Federal Rules contain no provisions on limiting instruc-
tions. 139 Section 403(c) should be retained even though it is silent
with respect to the standard of proof required for finding preliminary
facts and the number of jurors required to find those facts.
IX. Other Provisions Relating to Admissibility
Under the Code, questions of law, including questions concern-
ing the admissibility of evidence and other rules of evidence, are for
the court to decide. 140 Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) provides that
questions relating to the admissibility of evidence are to be deter-
mined by the court.14 1 Under the Code, questions of fact are to be
decided by the jury, including the effect and value of the evidence
138. CAL. JURY INSTRUcTIONS, CRIMINAL 2.01 (6th ed. 1996) ("CAIJIC"). But some Cali-
fornia cases suggest that facts found and used by jurors in a chain of reasoning leading to a
guilty verdict can be found by a preponderance of the evidence. For example, California
jurors are routinely told to disregard evidence of uncharged misdeeds unless they first find
by a preponderance of the evidence that the misdeed was committed. See CALJIC § 2.50.1
(2002 revision). In its note, the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, Criminal, ac-
knowledges a conceivable conflict between 2.01 and 2.50.1. Id. Other cases hold that in
screening the evidence under section 403, a judge should withhold the evidence from the
jury unless the judge finds that a reasonable jury could find the preliminary fact in issue by
a preponderance of the evidence. Under this standard a judge would withhold a co-con-
spirator's declaration from the jury unless the proponent proffers "sufficient evidence to
allow the trier of fact to determine that the conspiracy exists by a preponderance of the
evidence." People v. Herrera, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 911, 922 (Ct. App. 2000). This is the suffi-
ciency test which federal judges must employ. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.
681, 687 (1988).
The addition of the "more likely than not" standard probably adds little to the tradi-
tional sufficiency test since the test is still heavily tilted in favor of admissibility. For pur-
poses of admissibility, the question for the California trial judge under Proposition 8 would
appear to be whether a reasonable juror could find that a conspiracy existed if the propo-
nent's evidence is believed. Subject to certain exceptions, Proposition 8 requires the admis-
sion of relevant evidence as a matter of constitutional right in California criminal cases. See
CAL. CONST. art I § 28. Whetherjurors should be instructed to disregard the evidence after
it has been admitted unless they find the conspiracy or other preliminary fact by some
higher standard is a separate question.
139. Like the Code, the Rules do contain a provision concerning the limited admissi-
bility of evidence. See FED. R. Evwo. 105; CAL. EVID. CODE § 355 ("When evidence is admissi-
ble as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another
purpose, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and in-
struct the jury accordingly."). For the comparable Code provision, see CAL. EvD. CODE
§ 355.
140. See Cal. Evid. Code § 310.
141. See FED. R. EVJD. 104(a).
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addressed to it and the credibility of witnesses and hearsay declar-
ants. 142 The Rules do not have an analogous provision.
Under the Code, a person claiming the federal or state self-in-
crimination privilege "has the burden of showing that the proffered
evidence might tend to incriminate him" or her. 143 Further, "the prof-
fered evidence is inadmissible unless it clearly appears to the court
that the proffered evidence cannot possibly have a tendency to incrim-
inate the person claiming the privilege."' 144 The Rules do not have an
equivalent provision. Presumably, in federal court the privilege claim-
ant would rely on federal cases defining the witness privilege under
the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause.
Under the Code and the Rules, judges have discretion to deter-
mine whether hearings on preliminary fact questions should be con-
ducted out of the presence or hearing of the jury. 45 But the Rules
mandate all hearings on the admissibility of confessions to be held
outside the hearing of the jury. 146 The Code requires such a hearing
only upon request by a party.147
The Rules provide that the "accused does not, by testifying upon
a preliminary matter, become subject to cross-examination as to other
issues in the case." 148 The Code is silent on this point.
Both the Code and the Rules specify that the provisions gov-
erning preliminary fact questions do not limit the right of a party to
introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility. 149
As has been noted, the admission of proffered evidence often requires
the parties at trial to offer much of the same evidence received at the
admissibility hearing in order to afford the jurors a basis for determin-
ing the weight to be given to the evidence. 50
X. Summary of Major Differences Between the Code and the
Rules
Both the Code and Rules acknowledge that judges should exer-
cise different screening powers in determining the admissibility of evi-
dence. To preserve the jury's fact finding function, both require
142. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 312.
143. See id. § 404.
144. Id. § 404.
145. FED. R. Evio. 104(c); CAL. EvID. CODE § 402(b).
146. See FED. R. EvID. 104(c).
147. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 402(b).
148. FED. R. EviD. 104(d).
149. See FED. R. EvID. 104(e); CAL. EVID. CODE § 406,
150. See supra text accompanying note 130.
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judges to use a sufficiency standard in determining the admissibility of
certain kinds of evidence. By specifying the kinds of preliminary fact
disputes subject to this standard, section 403 provides judges and par-
ties greater guidance than does the conditional relevance approach
of Rule 104(b).
To assure the exclusion of evidence disfavored by the rules, both
the Code and the Rules give judges greater screening powers. The
Code achieves this goal by making section 405 a default provision. If
the preliminary fact dispute is not governed by section 403, it falls
within the ambit of section 405. If the rule of law governing the sec-
tion 405 dispute does not specify the burden of proof, other Code
default provisions require the proponent to come forward with proof
that convinces the judge by a preponderance of the evidence of the
existence or nonexistence of the disputed preliminary fact. 51
Rule 104(a) is also a default provision. In determining the admis-
sibility of evidence, the federal judge is to exercise the powers con-
ferred by this subdivision unless the preliminary fact question is
governed by Rule 104(b)'s conditional relevancy provision. While sec-
tion 405 does not attempt to specify the kinds of preliminary fact ques-
tions falling within the section, Rule 104(a) expressly provides that
preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence
are to be determined under subdivision (a) unless the question is gov-
erned by Rule 104(b).
The Code makes up for the lack of specificity in section 405 by
extensive discussion in the comments to sections 403 and 405 about
the kinds of preliminary facts falling within each section. The detailed
comments provide judges and parties with greater guidance than Rule
104 and its accompanying note. Although reasonable people can dif-
fer about whether the foundational facts for some hearsay exceptions
should be proved only by a sufficiency standard or by a higher stan-
dard, in their comments the drafters of the Code make clear their
election to treat some of these facts as raising only a sufficiency
issue. 152
The Rules do not specify which burden of persuasion applies
when the preliminary fact question is not governed by the sufficiency
standard. The United States Supreme Court, however, has "tradition-
151. See supra text accompanying note 99.
152. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 403, 405 assembly committee on the judiciary cmt.
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ally required that these matters be established by a preponderance of
proof." 153
The Code and the Rules are at odds with respect to the kind of
evidence that can be received to prove the existence or nonexistence
of preliminary facts when the judge is asked to make the admissibility
determinations contemplated by section 405 and Rule 104(a). Under
the Rules, the judge "is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges."'154 Under the Code, the rules of evi-
dence apply..5 5
The Code contains a provision regarding limiting instructions
when jurors are asked to re-determine the existence of preliminary
facts. 15" The Rules do not have an equivalent provision. 57
Finally, the Rules provide that in the case of some Best Evidence
Rule objections, the judge must allow the disputed preliminary fact to
go to the jury under a sufficiency standard when the issue is also a
question in the merits of the case.158 The related California provision
does not go this far with respect to similar questions raised under Cali-
fornia's Secondary Evidence Rule. 15'
153. Bouriaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
154. FED. R. EviD. 104(a).
155. See sulna text accompanying note 103.
156. See supra text accompanying note 113.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 113, 114.
158. See supra text accompanying note 122.
159. See supra text accompanying note 123.
[Vol. 37
